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AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION v. RENO
70 E3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
I. FACTS
The Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") arrested six resident aliens' after initiating
deportation proceedings against them. The aliens
were charged pursuant to the ideological provisions
of the McCarran-Walter Act of 19522 ("the Act',
which provided for the deportation of aliens who
advocated or who were affiliated with any organization advocating communism.3 The charges targeted their membership in the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP"), an alleged communist organization. The aliens were also charged
with non-ideological immigration violations.4 Initially, they challenged the constitutionality of the
statute. They claimed that the statute was overbroad,
in violation of their First Amendment rights. Prior
to the district court's hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the INS dropped the ideological charges against the plaintiffs' but retained the
non-ideological violation charges. At trial, the government argued that aliens do not enjoy First
Amendment rights in the deportation setting.6 The
district court disagreed, noting the long history of
case law affording aliens within the United States
First Amendment protection. 7 Furthermore, deporIAiad Barakat, Naim Nadim Sharif, Bashar Amer,
Ayman Obeid, Julie Mungai, and Amjad Obeid were collectively referenced as "the Six". Because of practical constraints, this case comment will address only the selective
enforcement claims of these six petitioners. The case also
held that the use of undisclosed dassified information in
legalization proceedings violated due process.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(6) (D), (F-H) (1988).
38
48

U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(6) (D),

(F-0-I).

U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(2, 9).
sAmerican-ArabAnti-Discrim. Com. v. Reno, 70 F.3d
1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 1995).The ideological charges were
dropped for tactical reasons.
6
American-ArabAnti-Discrim.Com. v. Meese, 714 F.
Supp. 1060, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
7 Aliens "within" the United States include
nonimmigrant aliens as well as permanent resident aliens.
Id. at 1074-1075. In fact, the Court of Appeals for California has held that aliens within the United States enjoy
the benefits of the First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 1074 (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135 (1945)) (Murphy, J. concurring). Congress' plenary power over immigration is not dispositive. See
Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). In that

tation did not limit these rights.8 In determining
whether the McCarran Act was overbroad, the district court considered whether it reached a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech.9
The challenged provisions of the McCarran Act proscribed the writing, publishing, circulating, distributing, printing, displaying, and possessing material
advocating or teaching the prohibited doctrines. 0
The court could not equate these prohibited actions
with advocacy of imminent unlawful action." Therefore, the court concluded that the McCarran Act
unlawfully reached speech protected by the First
2
Amendment.
The INS appealed the district court's decision.
On review, the Ninth Circuit held that although the
aliens had standing to challenge the McCarranWalter provisions, their constitutional challenges
were not ripe for review.13 Because the aliens no
longer faced charges under the challenged provisions
of the McCarran Act,14 they would not suffer hardship ifjudicial determination were delayed. Furthermore, the court was faced with many unknown
facts.' For example, the court did not know whether
the aliens were actually members of the PFLP or
the nature of the specific acts they had committed
in violation of the challenged provisions. 6 The
case, the Supreme Court conceded the Government's plenary immigration power in the substantive due process
area, but it refused to accord the same deference in the
First Amendment field.
8
American-ArabAnti-Discrim. Com., 714 F. Supp. at
1063.
9
Id. According to Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969), the government may only prohibit advocacy directed toward inciting or producing imminent lawless action which is likely to incite or produce such action.
'0 1d. at 1063.
" Id. at 1083.
'11d. at 1083-84.
11American-ArabAnti-Discrim. Com. v. Thornburgh,
970 F.2d 501, 510 (9th Cir. 1991).
'4American-ArabAnti-Discrim.Com., 970 F.2d at 512.
The INS dropped the ideological charges against the six
petitioners but retained the non-ideological charges. In
fact, the government expressly disavowed any intention
of filing future charges against appellees under the challenged provisions.
Is970
F.2d at 510-511.
'6 id .at 511.

United States Supreme Court has indicated that,
without proper factual development in the record,
its exercise of jurisdiction is inappropriate. 17 Courts
should avoid deciding important and difficult constitutional issues devoid of a factual context.'8 Similarly, a judicial determination should be withheld
until it is clear that the suing parties are within the
scope of an act.' 9
In addition to the scant factual record, there
existed no previous interpretation or application of
the challenged provisions.2" Neither the INS nor the
courts have had the opportunity to interpret these
provisions or to establish a policy implementing
them. 2' In essence, the Ninth Circuit would have to
interpret the statute, sua sponte and without the aid
of guiding principles, to determine whether the
aliens' membership in the PFLP was triggered by
the Act. To adjudicate the aliens' claims would undermine the basic premise of the ripeness doctrine:
"the court would become entangled in an abstract
disagreement over administrative policy and would
interfere before any INS decision was made affecting the parties in any concrete way."22 Therefore, the
issues were not fit for judicial determination.
Following the Court of Appeal's decision, the
aliens brought selective enforcement claims 2 in district court. They claimed that the INS had singled
them out for selective enforcement of the immigration laws because of their membership in an allegedly communist organization. 24 The district court
granted summary judgment on the selective enforcement claims.25 The court also preliminarily enjoined
further deportation proceedings against the aliens,
and the government appealed. 26
II. HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
preliminary injunction enjoining deportation proceedings against the aliens. The Court of Appeals
agreed that the aliens had presented a prima facie
claim of selective enforcement. To establish a prima
facie case of selective enforcement, claimants must

1"
Id. (citing W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of Am. v. Clark,
389 U.S. 309, 312 (1967)).
Isld.
19ld.
201d.
21

1d.

221d.

2American-ArabAnti-Discrim.Com. v. Reno, 70 F3d
at 1052. A selective enforcement claim is the immigra-

tion equivalent of a criminal selective prosecution claim.

prove that (1) others similarly situated have not been
prosecuted or "disparate impact" and (2) the prosecution is based on an impermissible motive or"discriminatory intent."2' The aliens proved that others
similarly situated had not been prosecuted. Therefore, the immigration laws were being enforced
against them discriminatingly. They also proved that
their prosecution was based on an impermissible motive-retaliation for the constitutionally protected
freedom of association.
III. ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
The Ninth Circuit had to determine whether
the district court abused its discretion when it issued the preliminary injunction and whether the
circumstances of the case warranted the preliminary
injunction.'8 A preliminary injunction is considered
appropriate "where plaintiffs show either a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of
irreparable injury, or that serious questions going to
the merits were raised and the balance of hardships
tips sharply in their favor."29
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the district's court issuance of the preliminary injunction was based on sound legal standards and findings of facts. The aliens satisfied both elements of a
selective enforcement claim. Crucial to the analysis
was the establishment of the appropriate control
group. The district court selected as a control group
those aliens who had either violated non-ideological provisions or were associated with terrorist organizations whose views the government tolerates.
The control group consisted of people similarly situated, in all respects, to aliens except for the attribute
on which their claims rested-affiliation with governmentally disfavored political views. The
government's evidence included prosecution of individuals who had actually committed terrorist acts,
rather than persons merely associated with terrorist
organizations. 30 In essence, the court heard no evidence that the INS had ever prosecuted persons similarly situated to appellees. Therefore, the district

2470

F.3d at 1054.

5Id.
26Id.
27 Id.

28Id.

29 Id. at 1062 (citing Johnson Controls,Inc. v. Phoenix

Control Sys&, Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 1989)).
3OId. at 1063. Appellees have never been charged with
participating in terrorist activity.

court's conclusion that the aliens presented prima
of disparate impact was not clearly
facie evidence
3
erroneous. '
The second element of a selective enforcement claim requires proof of an impermissible
motive. Evidence of the government's impermissible motive included former FBI director William Webster's testimony to Congress.3 2 He testified that the aliens were arrested because of their
membership in the PFLP.3 3 Webster also stated

that if these individuals had been United States
citizens, they could not have been arrested; for
citizens are permitted to belong to unfavorable
organizations like the PFLP.34 "[The] Government

cannot deny rights and privileges solely because
of a citizen's association with an unpopular organization." 3s Therefore, prosecuting aliens for
membership activity, lawfully exercised by citizens, constituted an impermissible motive.
The court used the Brandenbur 6 test as the
guiding principle for determining the lawfulness of
the government's prohibition on appellees' First
Amendment rights.37 However, the government did
not attempt to illustrate the aliens' satisfaction or
failure of the Brandenburgstandard. Rather, the gov-

ernment expounded its view that First Amendment
rights did not extend to aliens residing in the United
38
States who are subject to deportation proceedings.
The government failed to convince the Ninth Circuit.3 9 The court relied on Bridges v. Wixon 40 and
31Id.
32

1d. at 1053.

33
34

Id.

Id.

'11d. at 1063.
'5 Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (delin-

eating the standard for what constitutes permissible and
impermissible speech).
WAmerican-ArabAnti-Discrim., 70 F.3d at 1063.
38Id.

391d. at 1064-66.
40
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
4
' See United States v.Verdugo-Urquidez,494 U.S. 259,
271(1990); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590,
596-97
(1953).
42 American-Arab Anti-Discrim., 70 F3d at 1064.
43

Bridges, 326 U.S. at 138. Bridges was charged under 8 U.S.C. § 137.The statute defined as deportable any
alien who was "at the time of entering the United States,
or has been at any time thereafter" a member of or affiliated with an organization of the character attributed to
the Communist Party.
44 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. at 144.
4
1Id. The record showed that the government

defined "affiliation" such that it encompassed neutral mem-

other cases 4" to illustrate this country's long standthe United
ing practice of affording aliens within
42
States First Amendment protection.
In Bridges, the Court reversed a deportation order ofplaintiff Harry Bridges, allegedly affiliated with
the Communist Party.4 3 The court believed that the
deportation order erroneously rested on two factors.
First, the government misconstrued the term "affiliation" within the statute under which Bridges was
charged. 4 The government gave "affiliation" a meaning broader than the statute permitted. 41 Second,
Bridges was subject to an unfair hearing before the
order was issued.4 6 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Murphy focused on the court's history of intoler47
ance of inequitable treatment of resident aliens.
Justice Murphy thought that once an alien had lawfully entered and resided in this country, he was protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and

by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. 48 These constitutional provisions ap-

ply to all "persons" and guard against any encroachment by federal or state authority.4 9 In a later case,"
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,0 the Court stated that
resident aliens were, indeed, entitled to constitutional protection under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and that these provisions make
no distinction between citizens and resident aliens.5'
Currently, Justice Murphy's Bridges concurrence is
the majority view with respect to resident aliens'
rights.
bership activities, for example, assisting in the enterprises
of an organization and securing members for it. Id. The
proper construction of affiliation requires an adherence

to or a furtherance of the purposes or objectives of the
"Affiliation," in the Court's
proscribed organization. Id.
opinion, was distinguishable from mere cooperation with
the organization's lawful activities. Id.
461d. at 150-51. Highly incriminating statements appeared in therecord about Bridges' membership in the
Communist party. Even though government regulations
made these statements inadmissable and Bridges repeatedly objected to their admissibility, they were, nonetheless, admitted
as substantive evidence.
47
Id.at 161.
4S1d.
49

1d.

-5Kwong Hai Chew v.Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1952).
s'344 U.S. at 596. Kwong Hai Chew, was an alien

and lawful permanent resident of the United States. He
was detained while returning from a voyage as a seaman
on a vessel of American registry. The Attorney General
ordered his detention and temporarily excluded him from
the United States. Chew was deemed an alien whose entry was prejudicial to the public interest. Petitioner was
ordered permanently excluded without notice of the

The government set forth a series of arguments
to rebut the Ninth Circuit's finding that the resident aliens were entitled to the full range of First
Amendment rights.5 2 Their most compelling argument was that Congress' plenary power over immigration matters allowed limiting the First Amendment protection of aliens facing deportation.5 3 The
court recognized that Congress and the President
possessed virtually unfettered discretion to regulate
aliens' admission into this country-s4 At the same
time, however, Congress' power to deport a resident alien was a more restrained power, subject to
constitutional constraints.5 s
The United States Supreme Court has consistently distinguished between aliens within the
United States and those attempting to enter from
outside the country.56 "The Bill of Rights is a futile
authority for the alien seeking admission for the first
time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested
with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to
all people within our borders."57 The Court has acknowledged this longstanding distinction between
resident aliens and those seeking entry, characterizing it as a difference between unprotected status at
the threshold of admission and the protected status
within the national community 8 Although use of
summary processes and procedures is appropriate
in an exclusion determination, the same is not true
of a deportation proceeding. The government's argument failed because the appellees in this case were
resident aliens facing deportation, not exclusion.
Hence, they were entitled to the full protection of
the First Amendment even in the face of deportation.

9

After a review of the district court's decision to
issue a preliminary injunction against the government, the circuit court found that the district court
did not base its decision on an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact. The
aliens' First Amendment rights were subject to irreparable harm because of the government's unavail-

charges against him and without the opportunity to be
heard. The Court held that his detention was unlawful.
Id. at 603.

S2American-ArabAnti-Discrim.,70 E3d at 1064-1066.
s370
F.3d at 1065.
54

Id.

55

Id.
-%Id.
S7Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161.
S"Ainerican-ArabAnti-Discrim.,70 F.3d at 1065.
59 Id.

ing attempt to prosecute them. ° Furthermore, petitioners had a strong likelihood of success on their
claim that the INS had selectively enforced the immigration laws in retaliation for their exercise of their
right to associate.6' Thus, the circuit court held, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in preliminary enjoining deportation proceedings against the
aliens.62
IV. CONCLUSION
Aliens within the United States are afforded
protection under the First Amendment and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These
rights are applicable even in the deportation context. Neither the Constitution nor the courts have
ever made entitlement to these protections dependent on an individual's legal status as an alien or a
citizen. This court, along with its predecessors, assumes that aliens physically within the borders of
our country want to remain in the United States,
not only to reap the benefits of a democratic society, but to contribute to it as well. In fact, "[t]he
Framers explicitly recognized that aliens within this
country participate in a reciprocal relationship of
societal obligations and correlative protection."'
The United States is viewed as a melting pot,
and this image continues as the number of incoming aliens grows. Having diverse cultures within our
country is an attirbute mportant to American culture. Throughout the opinion, the Ninth Circuit
made several references to our "national community," reflecting a general desire and acceptance of
people of different cultures who want to contribute
to and be a part of our society. Perhaps courts like
the Ninth Circuit are trying to undo the past wrongs
consistently and unfairly visited upon aliens. 64 The
judiciary's vehement intolerance for alien discrimination can be equated to the same intolerance it has
for racial discrimination. Blacks, like aliens, have been
subjected to private as well as governmental discrimination. The longtime and consistently inequitable

60

d at 1066.

61 Id.
63 Id. at 1065.

r1Id. Aliens have been subjected to intolerant and
harassing conduct in our past, particularly in times of crises. For example, Congress authorizes the President to
expel "all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the
peace and safety of the United States". See Alien Enemies
Act of 1798, Act of June 25, 1798, ch.58, I Stat, 570,
571.

treatment of blacks resulted in the creation of comprehensive federal and local anti-discrimination
models, such as Title VII and affirmative action programs. These programs, some of which protect
against alien discrimination, are pervasive in our
society. The Ninth Circuit in this case simply followed precedent and ensured that our national community remains intact. In light of the United States
Supreme Court's unfettered insistence on affording
aliens physically within our borders core constitutional rights, the legislation recently passed which
expedites deportation proceedings is likely to encounter significant resistance.
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